Month: September 2022

Let’s paint a hypothetical scenario. 

Daemon had a scuffle with Viserys during a friendly match. The former head butts the latter on his ribcage. His ribcage didn’t break because of the headbutt but it broke because Viserys had an accident in the past which made his ribcage weak. This weakened ribcage led to Visery’s death. 

If a normal person whose ribcage wasn’t damaged was hit in the same way and with the same intensity, that person wouldn’t have sustained any injuries and death wouldn’t have occurred. 

Although Deamon was unaware of the fragility of Visery’s condition, can he be held liable for his death? 

This scenario centers on the Thin-skull principle relating to the offence of Murder under Nigerian Criminal Law.  It is a trite principle of law that for the prosecution to secure a conviction against the accused in a murder case, he must prove the three elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. Asuquo v State (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1532) 309 SC.

These elements are: (a)that the deceased died; (b) that the death of the deceased was caused by the accused; [c]and that the accused intended to either kill or cause the deceased grievous bodily harm. The three elements(death, causation, and intention) must co-exist at the time, if not, the accused is entitled to be acquitted of the offence . 

Today’s analysis centers on the Thin-skull or Eggshell principle which is pivotal in proving causation which is the second element in the offence of Murder. The principle means that one must take his victim as he finds him.

Popular in Tort and then extended to Criminal law, the doctrine holds that the accused cannot use the frailty of the victim as a defence to escape liability. The doctrine seeks to protect the rights of a person with a pre-existing condition that makes him more susceptible to injury than another person. 

The classic case that gave rise to this doctrine is Dulieu v. White & Sons (1901) 2 KB 669 at 679 (called the“thin-skull” case), where the Judge opined: “If a man is negligently run over or otherwise negligently injured in his body, it is no answer to the sufferer’s claim for damages that he would have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had not had an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak heart.”

In Patrick v State (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1645) 263 SC, the appellant bought a motorcycle for the deceased(Sule) and it was agreed that he would remit a certain sum of money daily to the appellant and park the motorcycle daily at an agreed place for safety. The deceased adhered to this agreement until 30/7/2008 when the appellant did not see the motorcycle where it should have been, and he went along with the second defendant to find the deceased.

They met up with him between 12.30am and 1am on 1/8/2008, and without waiting to hear what happened to the said motorcycle, they beat up the deceased and left him in the gutter, where he was discovered dead in the morning hours of that same day.

On trial, the appellant testified in his defence that when he came into the scene to allegedly beat Sule, Sule had been so badly and fatally wounded that he could no longer talk and was clearly on the verge of kicking the bucket. In other words, though he was alive, he was as good as dead since he could no longer talk, and even when people spoke to him he could not respond. Hence his beating couldn’t have caused his death.

In rejecting this defence, the Supreme Court held that the defendant is not entitled to make assumptions about the victim. Any characteristics, which the victim happens to have, must be taken into account in the judgment, whether or not, the defendant could reasonably have known about them. In the words of Augie J.S.C, “in this instant case, the appellant’s defence that the deceased was already injured that night could not avail him. The sequence from the beating of the deceased by the appellant to his death immediately afterwards and arrest of the appellant at the scene of the crime indicates that it was the assault by the appellant that caused the death of the deceased.”

In addition, since the matter happened in Lagos State, the court’s decision was further strengthened by the provision of Section 311 of the Criminal Code Law of Lagos State. The said provision has a statutory provision for the eggshell principle which states that a person who does any act which hastens the death of a person who has a disorder or disease arising from another cause is deemed to have killed that other person. 

It’s pertinent to note that this principle has been extended to beliefs. Hence in  R v Blaue (1975) Cr App R 271, the defendant stabbed a woman who was a Jehovah’s Witness. As a result of her religious belief, she refused a blood transfusion that would have saved her life. This led to her death. The court, based on the doctrine of the thin skull principle, rejected the defendant’s argument that her refusal to accept blood transfusion broke the chain of causation and held him liable for the victim’s death. 

In conclusion, the doctrine of thin-skull protects people with pre-existing vulnerabilities so that the accused would not escape liability on the ground of existing weakness.

Stay safe and act gently. Thank you for reading. See you next week

Three legal terminologies are relevant to a court’s judgment. These are ratio decidendi, obiter dictum, and per incuriam. Though today’s article centers on the obiter dictum of the Supreme Court, attention will quickly be given to the status of these aforementioned terms in order to aid a proper understanding of this article.

On the first one, ratio decidendi is the reason behind a court’s decision. It is the principle or rule of law on which a court’s decision is founded. For instance, if Mr. A kills Mr. B in a provocation that wasn’t done in the heat of passion, Mr. A will be liable for Murder and sentenced to death penalty. The reason behind the Court’s decision in this hypothetical example will be the statutory provision of Section 319 of the Criminal Code and several judicial precedents that have prescribed death as the punishment for unlawful homicide. 

Moving on, an obiter dictum is a statement made in passing that does not reflect the ratio decidendi, that is, the reasoning or ground upon which a case is decided. It is an expression of opinion made in giving a judgment by the Judge but not necessary to his decision and, accordingly, cannot form part of the ratio decidendi of the judgment. 

On per incuriam, the Latin word “incuria” or “incuriae,” means carelessness or neglect. The legal connotation is that when a case is decided Per incuriam, it denotes the idea that it is decided through inadvertence and or in ignorance of the relevant law. Per incuriam in law means the Judge gave a judgment in ignorance or forgetfulness of an enabling statute or some binding authority on the court. As a general rule, the only cases in which decisions should be held to have been reached Per incuriam are those decisions: – (a) given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provisions, or (b) given in ignorance of some authorities or statute binding on the court concerned; so that in such cases, some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based is found, on that account, to be demonstrably wrong. Rossek v A.C.B  LTD  (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 382. 

In the Nigerian legal system, courts are hierarchically structured with the Supreme Court occupying the apogee position followed by the Court of Appeal, and then Courts of coordinate jurisdiction such as the State High Court, Federal High Court, The National Industrial Court, etc. The list goes on and on.

Having laid the foundation, the question then becomes: is the obiter dictum of the Supreme Court binding on itself and other lower courts?  

While it’s true that the ratio decidendi and per incuriam decisions of the Supreme Court have a binding effect on all other courts, the same privilege is not enjoyed when it comes to Obiter Dictum.  The general principle of law is that an obiter dictum of the Supreme Court is not binding on the supreme court itself or indeed on the lower courts, for obiter dicta, though they may have considerable weight, are not rationes decidendi and are therefore not conclusive authority. And it is immaterial the justice who gave the dictum, even if it’s the Chief Justice. 

However, there is leeway. I knew you anticipated that. The exception is that, if an obiter dictum in one case has been adopted and becomes a ratio decidendi in a latter case, such an obiter dictum will be taken to have acquired the force of a ratio decidendi and would therefore become binding. 

At this juncture, it is noteworthy that supreme court decisions reached per incuriam are binding on all courts.  As held in State v Alli,(2020) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1755) 69, “the Court of Appeal does not have the power to review the decision of the supreme court and proceed to declare it as given per incuriam. Instead, by the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court of Appeal is bound by the decisions of the supreme court until and unless the supreme court itself is presented with an opportunity to review its own decision and in its discretion, decide whether or not to reverse itself.”

In Dairo v UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1059) 99, the Court held that: “the question of whether a decision or pronouncement of the Supreme Court is binding on the Court of Appeal depends on whether that decision or pronouncement is an obiter dictum or was made per incuriam. If the pronouncement is a mere obiter dictum then, of course, it cannot be binding, but if it was made per incuriam, it will nevertheless be binding on the Court of Appeal in accordance with the principle of stare decisis until the error in the judgment has been corrected.” See also 7Up Bottling Co. Ltd. v Abiola & Sons (Nig.) Ltd. (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 383) 257; Afro- Continental Nig. Ltd. v Ayantuyi (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 411.

In conclusion,  the dicta of the Supreme Court have persuasive effects. And until they have been adopted as ratio decidendi in a latter case, they can’t be binding on the Supreme Court itself and any other lower courts. 

Thank you for reading. See you next week.