Month: April 2023

The Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th edition, on page 1351 defines Public Office as a position whose occupant has the legal authority to exercise a government sovereign power for a fixed period. An officer is defined by the same dictionary on Page 1193 as a person who holds an office of trust, authority, or command. In public affairs, the term – public officers refer to persons holding public office under a national, state, or local government and authorised by that government to exercise some specific functions. 

The Interpretation Act Cap 123 LFN 2004 defines a public office holder as an officer who discharges any duty in the discharge of which the public are interested, more clearly so if he is paid out of a fund provided by the public. In Nigeria, the law protecting Public Officers is the Public Officers Protection Act, similarly in most States in  Nigeria as Public Officers (Protection) Law. Ubiquitously, the protective section is section 2.

Section 2 of the Act, provides: “where any action, prosecution, or other proceedings is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or any public duty or authority or in respect of any such law, duty, or authority, the following provisions shall have an effect –(a) the action, prosecution, or proceedings shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months after the act, neglect, or default complained.”

In simple terms, the general effect of this provision is that no court will have the competence to sit on a matter brought against a public officer outside the statutory three months time frame. 

The rationale behind this law is to protect a public officer from detraction and unnecessary litigation. As held in Sani v President of Federal Republic of Nigeria (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt.1746) 151, the provision of section 2 is to protect public officers acting in the execution of public duties from litigation. 

In Aroyame v Governor of Edo State (2023) 1 NWLR 549, the appellant was removed as the Auditor General of  Edo State by the Governor of the State with effect from 1st October 2000. The information was conveyed to the appellant by a letter dated 28th September 2000 signed. Y the secretary to the State Government. By a further letter dated 29 September 2000, the appellant was retired from the Civil Service with effect from 30th September 2000.  Six months after and on 3rd April 2001, he commenced a suit against the respondents. The Supreme Court per Kekere-Ekun JSC held that the matter was statute-barred. The learned justice further opined that the effect of a statute of limitation is to denude a plaintiff of his action, that is his right of enforcement and right to judicial relief. 

However, it is pertinent to state that protection under section 2(a) of the law is not a blanket shield to be carried and used by public officers to blatantly indulge in illegalities and the perpetuation of injustice whenever their officials acts are challenged in Court. In Offoboche v Ogoja Local Government &. Amor (2001) 16 NWLR (PT. 739) 458, the SC held: “the Public Officers (Protection) law is designed to protect the officer who acts in good faith and does not apply to acts done in abuse of office and with no semblance of legal justification. Thus, the law will not apply if it’s established that the defendant had abused his position to act maliciously. In such a state, he has abused his position for the purpose of doing wrong and the protection of the law would never apply to such a case.”

Hence, in Awolola v Governor of Ekiti State &Ors  (2018) LPELR-46346 SC, one of the issues for determination was whether or not the act of relocating the Local Government Headquarters from Eda-Oniyo to Iye-Ekiti was legal or not. The headquarters of Ilejemeje was established by statute, that is Decree No 36 of 1996. Its relocation could only be effected through another statute promulgated by the same competent authority. The Court stated that “I have flipped through the record of this appeal and I have not found any evidence that Decree No 36 of 1996 has been repealed by a subsequent law that has relocated the headquarter of ilemeje local government from Eda oniyo to Iye Ekiti….the respondents knew and had every reason to know that the location of Ilemeje Local Government headquarters at Eda-Oniyo was made through a statute and that same could be relocated only by Statute. The respondents’ act of relocating the headquarters without the enabling statute was held by the Court to be done male fide and without legal justification. Hence, they are not protected by the Public Officer Protection Law of Ekiti State.“

So when it is established to the satisfaction of the Court that the public officer acted maliciously or outside the scope of his duties granted to him by the Constitution or statutes establishing that office, he will automatically lose the protection of the law or act. Hence, the mandatory three months time frame will not be put into consideration. 

However, the Courts in several cases propounded a number of exceptions to the protection provided for public officers under the Act. In FGN v  Zebra Energy LTD (2002) 18 NWLR (PT.798) 162, the Court held that the public officers (protection) law does not apply in cases of recovery of land, breaches of contract, or claims for work or labour done. 

Also, in INEC v Ogbadibo LG & Ors (2015) LPELR-24839 (SC), the court held that the protection doesn’t extend to continuing damages or losses. For example, if I am a police officer and I maliciously detained the vehicle of Mr. A who runs Uber in April 2023. So what happens if Mr. A decides to commence an action against me, let’s say, October 2023, will I still be protected? No, I won’t. The reason is that the injury Mr. A will complain of is the loss of earnings from the vehicle used for commercial purposes. Hence, for every day the vehicle remains with me, he’s incurring losses. 

In conclusion, the Public Officers Protection Act/Laws is a shield that protects public officers in Nigeria. However, a public officer will lose this shield when he acts beyond the scope of his duty or acts maliciously or if the act falls within any of the exceptions.

Thank you for reading. See you next week.

Personally, I love public holidays. They offer me the best opportunity to catch up with school activities. As I have always written to you readers, law permeates the entirety of human endeavours. In Nigeria, the law governing public holidays is the Public Holidays Act. 

Today’s analysis centers on whether or not Saturdays and Sundays are holidays within the Act and the effect of legal actions carried out on those days. As held in Etsako West L.G.C. v. Christopher(2014)14 NWLR (Pt. 1426) 73, by virtue of section 15(5) of the Interpretation Act, “holiday” as used in Section 15 of the Act, means a day which is a Sunday or a public holiday. As contained in the schedule, Public holidays in Nigeria are New Year’s Day; Good Friday; Easter Monday; Workers’ Day (1st May); National  Day (1st October); Christmas Day; Such day as the Minister may declare to be a public holiday in celebration of the Muslim festival of Id el Fitr, Id el Kabir and celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammed (Id el Maulud).

In addition to days mentioned in the Schedule of this Act, the President may by public notice appoint a special day to be kept as a public holiday either throughout Nigeria or in any part thereof, and any day so appointed shall be kept as a public holiday. Section 2 of the Act. Based on this, Saturday is not a public holiday within the act. In addition, while a public holiday necessarily includes a work-free day, a work-free day like a Saturday is not synonymous with a public holiday unless expressly so declared. Anie v. Uzorka (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 309) 1.

While this appears simple, it usually becomes complicated in election tribunals. One of the traits of all laws affecting election petition tribunals is the essentiality of time. The spirit of the laws is that petitions should be given expeditious adjudication to enable the parties to know the status. Abdullahi v. Elayo (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 268) 171.

In filling election petitions or appeals, the date of the event is excluded from the computation of time, and the last day being a dias non-juridicus cannot also be taken into reckoning in the computation of time. The principle of the exclusion of the day of the happening of an event has become a principle of general acceptance. Where a statutory period runs from a named date to another, or the statute prescribes some period of days or weeks or months or years within which some act has to be done, although the computation of the period must in every case depend on the intention of parliament as gathered from the statute, generally, the first day of the period will be excluded from the reckoning, and consequently the last day will be included. 

However, where the last day within which to do the act is a Sunday which is statutorily declared to be a public holiday by virtue of section 15(5) of the Interpretation Act, the period for the doing of the act shall extend till the next day in view of the provision of section 15(2)(b) and of the Interpretation Act. 

In Yakubu v. F.R.N. (2023) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1864) 9,  judgment was delivered by the trial court on the 28th January 2013, time for filing a notice of appeal began to run from the 29th January 2013 up until the prescribed 90th day, which was the 28th April 2013. However, since the 28th of April, 2013 was a Sunday, a statutory public holiday, the notice of appeal filed by the respondent to challenge the decision of the trial court, on the 29th of April 2013, being the 91st day after the judgment was delivered, was valid. In Shugaba v. U.B.N. Plc (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 500) 481, the Court of appeal held that the ruling of the court below was not invalidated by reason of the fact that it was delivered on a Saturday.

Furthermore, it is pertinent to state that High Court Civil Procedure rules can depart from this general rule and make Saturday a public holiday. This is because the computation of time in election petitions is a matter of court practice and each court has its way of doing things. Hence, in Ikpala Est. Hotels Ltd. v. N.E.P.A. (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 884) 249, the Court held that since the statute that regulates the practice and procedure of the High Court of Cross River State, that is, the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules contemplates Saturday as a public holiday or a work-free day, Section 15(5) of the Interpretation Act and Section 1 of the Public Holidays Act would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.

On the propriety of hearing a case on a public holiday, the court in Okubre v. Ibanga (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 154) 1 held that “a public holiday in this country is like a Sunday, dies non jurisdicus, and no legal proceedings can be held on such a day. Dies non juridicum is the full Latin phrase literally meaning “Day without judiciary.” The expression dies non (juridicus) was used for defining a day which is not a (court) day or a day on which no legal business is carried on.”

In conclusion, unless expressly forbidden by Rules of Courts, the general principle of law is that Saturday as a day of the week does not qualify as a public holiday. Therefore, in computing the time within which to file an election petition, Saturday will not be reckoned as a public holiday. Kaugama v. N.E.C. (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 284) 681; Balogun v. Odumosu (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt. 592) 590; A.-G., Ondo State v. A.-G., Ekiti State(2001) 17 NWLR (Pt. 732) 706.

Thank you for reading. See you next week.

The Supreme Court of Nigeria is the apex court of the land. The Court, just as every other court in this country, is a creation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and its jurisdiction is donated and circumscribed by the 1999 Constitution, and the Supreme Court Act. Obiuweubi v. Central Bank of Nigeria (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465.

Apart from the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court contained in section 232 of the Constitution, the National Assembly also has the power to confer additional original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court on any issue excluding Criminal matters. In the exercise of this power, the National Assembly enacted the Supreme Court (Additional Original Jurisdiction) Act CAP S16 LFN 2004. 

Section 1(1) of the Supreme Court (Additional Original Jurisdiction) Act states the Supreme Court shall to the exclusion of any other court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute between –

(a)the National Assembly and the President;

(b)the National Assembly and any State House of Assembly; and

(c)the National Assembly and the State of the Federation. In so far as that dispute involves any question, whether of law or fact, on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. 

As held in Oko v. A.G. Ebonyi State (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1795) 63, a legal right is a right recognisable in law. It means a right recognised by law and capable of being enforced by the plaintiff. It is a right of a party recognised and protected by a rule of law, the violation of which would be a legal wrong done to the interest of the plaintiff, even though no action is taken. The determination of the existence of a legal right is not whether the action will succeed at the trial but whether the action denotes such a right by reference to the enabling law in respect of the commencement of the action. See also A.G Lagos State v. AG Federation (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 833) 1

So in the case of President, F.R.N. v. National Assembly (2023) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1870) 1, upon the presentation of the Electoral Bill 2022 to the plaintiff, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, he assented to it and it became law, to wit, the Electoral Act, 2022. Thereafter, the case of the plaintiff was that section 84(12)of the Electoral Act, 2022 was unconstitutional, null, and void, being discriminatory against political appointees and therefore violated the provisions of section 42(1) of the Constitution, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the United Nations Declarations on Human Rights.

Upon careful examination, the Supreme Court held that the case did not involve any question on which the existence or extent of any legal right depended, nor involved the civil rights and obligations of the plaintiff. The action, therefore did not fall within the ambit of section 232 of the the1999 Constitution (as amended) and Section 1(1)of the Supreme Court (Additional Jurisdiction)Act 2002.

Thank you for reading. See you next week.