This week’s article centers on an interesting topic: the legal implications surrounding the criminal liability of someone who tests the effectiveness of a gun charm on an individual with that individual’s consent, resulting in the individual’s death. This scenario is not uncommon in our society, often portrayed in Nollywood movies where herbalists test the potency of their charms on the person who commissioned them.
The legal issues in this scenario are: Is the accused liable for murder in such a situation? Does the victim’s consent serve as an exclupatory defense against the charge of murder? This scenario is modelled after the case of State v Okezie (1972) 2 E.C.S.L.R. 419. In that case, the defendant, a native doctor, crafted some charms for the deceased. Subsequently, the deceased invited the defendant to assess the efficacy of the charm by testing it on him, specifically by firing a shot. Tragically, the defendant complied and shot the deceased in the chest, resulting in his death. As a consequence, the defendant was convicted of murder.
The legal principle at play here is that consent given by a person to cause their own death does not absolve any individual who causes that death from criminal responsibility. Hence, the principle of volenti non fit injuria(to the willing, no injury is done) doesn’t apply in this circumstance. This principle also underpins the criminalization of voluntary euthanasia in Nigeria.
In criminal law jurisprudence, the law is trite that there are three ways for the prosecution to prove its case against an accused person, and these are: (a)direct evidence; (b)circumstantial evidence; or (c)his confessional statement. Fatilewa v State (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1101) 518; Ogedengbe v.State (2014) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1421) 338; Egboghonomev. State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 306) 383.
A confession, whether made extrajudicially or judicially, is an admission by the accused suggesting their guilt. Confessions carry significant weight in court, often considered stronger evidence than other forms of proof. Adebayo v State (2014) LPELR-22988(SC) and Oseni v. State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1293)351.
However, a crucial question arises when considering jointly committed crimes: can a person be convicted based on the confession of a co-accused? The law is settled that The confession of an accused person cannot bind his co-accused person neither can it be the basis for the conviction of his co- accused person, except the co-accused person adopts the confession by words or conduct. Agboola v State [2024] 2 NWLR (pt 1922) 372(P. 409, paras. A-F).
Section 29(4) of the Evidence Act 2011 further emphasizes this point, stating that if one co-accused makes a confession in the presence of others, it cannot be used against those others unless they explicitly adopt it. Failure to comply with this provision renders such confessions inadmissible against the non-adopting co-accused. Thus in Nwamiro v State (2023) LPELR-60423(CA), the court held that: “Accordingly, I agree with the appellant that Section 29(4) of the Evidence Act was not complied with by the respondent, nor was there any title of evidence to establish that the appellant adopted the confessional statement of the co-defendant by word or conduct, consequently, the lower Court erred in relying on the confessional statement(s) of the co-defendant as one of the planks in convicting the appellant.”
In conclusion, while an accused’s confession can be damning evidence against themself, it cannot automatically implicate a co-accused but where the prosecution or the police intends to use the statement against a co-accused then the prosecution or the police is bound to make a copy of the incriminating statement available to the co-accused and the co-accused then adopts the statement.
Trafficking encompasses the transportation, trading, or dealing with illegal goods or people. There are various forms of trafficking, but our focus in this week’s article is on sex trafficking. This abhorrent crime violates the fundamental right to human dignity as contained in Section 34 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) as amended. Despite being clandestine, sex trafficking is rampant in Nigeria, exacerbated by widespread economic hardship. In fact, recently, Mo Abudu’s film, Òlòturé, vividly portrays the grim reality of sex trafficking, shedding light on its pervasive nature.
In Nigeria, the legislation addressing this crime is the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act of 2015, which repealed the earlier Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act of 2003. However, the two cases under discussion here were decided using the 2003 Act.
Section 5 of the 2015 Act assigns the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) with the responsibility of overseeing and coordinating all activities related to human trafficking. NAPTIP’s investigative department is authorized to collaborate with law enforcement agencies such as the police, Immigration Service, Customs Service, and others to prevent and detect offenses outlined in the Agency’s enabling Act. While the agency holds the power to prosecute offenders, it also has the discretion to collaborate with other security agencies.
In Mohammed v AG Federation (2021) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1764) 397, the supreme court held that before a conviction could be secured for human trafficking offense, the prosecution is required to prove that: 1. the accused person participated in the procurement of the victim for the purpose of prostitution; 2. the accused person organized the travel of the victim for the said purpose; and 3. there was deceitful inducement of the victim by the accused.
In Oshi v State (2022) LPELR-58105(CA), one of the victims (PW3) testified that she, along with PW1 and another girl, was promised a job as a salesgirl in Lagos for a monthly salary of N10,000 by Madam Nnabuke. However, they were taken to Ogbomosho by the Appellant’s son. There, the Appellant informed them they would be used for prostitution, instructing them to give her N5,000 daily from their earnings. PW3 worked at a hotel, sleeping with about twenty clients daily and charging N3,000 per round. The Appellant collected N5,000 daily, and on days PW3 earned less, she was beaten. The trial Judge found PW3’s testimony credible and convicted the Appellant based on this evidence. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision.
In Mohammad’s case, the appellant and one Eunice Owoyele were alleged to have engaged in the trafficking of individuals to Libya, where they were subjected to sexual molestation, sold, and forced into prostitution. They faced charges related to inducement, procurement, and organizing travel for prostitution, contravening the Trafficking in Persons Prohibition Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 (as amended), punishable under the same section of the Act.
It’s pertinent to state that where a statute prescribes a mandatory sentence in clear terms, the courts are without jurisdiction to impose anything less than the mandatory sentence as no discretion exists to be exercised. Rather, it is a duty imposed by law and the sentence must be pronounced without any reservation. Hence, in Mohammad’s case, the supreme court said that the provisions of sections 15(a), 16, and 19(b) of the Trafficking in Persons Prohibition Law Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003 under which the appellant was charged give no discretion to the Judge to mitigate sentence. Having found the accused guilty under those sections of the Act, the court was bound to impose the mandatory sentence. The trial court and the Court of Appeal were therefore wrong to impose and affirm a sentence of 3 years imprisonment for count 3, whereas the statute prescribes a mandatory term of 10 years imprisonment or a fine which must not exceed N200,000.00, or both.
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