Month: August 2024

Hello, dear readers. This week, we’ll be discussing the status of provisional admission offered by the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB).

In Onagoruwa v JAMB (2001) 10 NWLR (Pt. 722), the appellant sat for the 1993/94 JAMB examination and ‘successfully’ passed. As a result, he received a letter of provisional admission to pursue a first-degree program in Electrical Engineering at the University of Ilorin. He accepted the offer, registered, and began his studies. However, the situation took an unexpected turn when JAMB informed the University that it had cancelled the appellant’s exam results and urged the institution to withdraw Onagoruwa’s admission.

Feeling aggrieved, the appellant took legal action against JAMB at the Federal High Court, seeking declaratory reliefs, an injunction to continue his studies, and N5 million in damages. Initially, the court granted an interlocutory injunction that allowed him to continue his studies while the case was being decided. However, JAMB defended its actions by explaining that after the initial release of the examination results, they conducted a post-exam review of 401,791 candidates. Among these, 1,706 candidates, including the appellant, were found to have discrepancies in their marks, leading to the cancellation of their results and subsequent withdrawal of their provisional admissions.

Further complicating the case, it was noted that the appellant did not contest the defense’s claim that his original score was inaccurate. During cross-examination, evidence was presented showing that the score indicated on his notification of results as 214 was incorrect and that his actual score was 112. This lower score was not enough to secure him admission on merit.

Since the principle of law, as held in Pascutto v Adecentro (Nig.) Limited (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt.529) 467  is that where evidence given by a party to any proceedings was not challenged by the other party who had opportunity to do so, it is open to the court seized of the matter to act on such unchallenged evidence before it, and owing to that fact that the appellant did not challenge this evidence, the court acted on it.

In addition, the trial court, after considering the evidence, dismissed the appellant’s claims entirely. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the appellant took the matter to the Court of Appeal. One of the issues for determinations during the appeal was the nature of a valid contract. For a contract to be binding, there must be a mutual understanding and agreement between the parties involved. In this case, JAMB argued that the post-examination review revealed that the appellant did not meet the minimum entry requirements for admission. Therefore, there was no valid contract between him and the University since the conditions for a final admission were not fulfilled.

Furthermore, Section 5 of Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board Act empowers the authority to regulate admissions into Nigerian tertiary institutions, including the power to cancel results. While JAMB can cancel a candidate’s results, this power must be exercised fairly and justly, without any form of arbitrariness. The court examined whether JAMB had acted within its rights and found that the cancellation of the appellant’s results was within their legal authority

A significant aspect of this case centered around the meaning of “provisional” in the context of the admission letter issued by JAMB. The term “provisional” is defined as something temporary, preliminary, or tentative. In legal terms, it implies that the offer of admission is not final and may be withdrawn if certain conditions are not met. In the appellant’s case, the court held that since the admission was provisional, JAMB was within its rights to rescind it upon discovering the discrepancies in his examination results.

Finally, the court addressed the duty of a party seeking declaratory relief. It emphasized that the burden is on the claimant to present evidence proving their entitlement to such relief. In this instance, the appellant failed to provide evidence to support his claim that he was not involved in any examination malpractice, leading the court to deny the declaratory relief he sought.

Moving on, I think while the court’s decision that the appellant should prove that he did not engage in exam malpractice is legally sound, practically achieving this is incredibly challenging. How would one gather evidence to prove that especially in such a scenario? Would the appellant have to call his exam seatmates as witnesses or request CCTV footage? Even then, JAMB controls such footage, and what happens in rural centers where CCTV wasn’t used? These practical hurdles make discharging the burden of proof an onerous task. In the Onagoruwa’s case, it seems the appellant lost because he may have indeed been involved in exam malpractice. Otherwise, why didn’t he challenge the evidence against him? The lack of a challenge raises questions and implies that the appellant might not have been entirely innocent.

In conclusion, Onagoruwa’s case underscores the temporary nature of provisional admissions and the significant power JAMB holds in ensuring that only candidates who meet all criteria are granted final admission into Nigerian universities

Good afternoon, amazing readers. This week, we will be exploring the topic of proof of adultery under two distinct legal systems: the Marriage Act and Islamic Law. Our discussion will center around how adultery is defined, the standards of proof required, and the consequences under these systems, with particular emphasis on the cases of Alabi v. Alabi (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1039) 297 and Rungumawa v. Rungumawa (2002) 1 NWLR (pt 747).

In Alabi v. Alabi, the appellant married the respondent on January 3, 1999. By 2002, the appellant sought a divorce, citing the respondent’s behaviour as intolerable and the marriage has irretrievably broken down. He also sought custody of their only child. The respondent countered with allegations of adultery, claiming the appellant had been involved with one Aramide Babatunde even before their marriage. This relationship allegedly resulted in the birth of two children, one conceived before the marriage and the other after. The respondent further described the appellant as a man of unstable character, with a disregard for their marriage and an insatiable appetite for women. After the appellant drove the respondent away in June 2002, she filed a cross-petition seeking dissolution of the marriage, damages for adultery, custody of their child, and monthly maintenance.

In Rungumawa v. Rungumawa, the appellant sought to dissolve her six-year marriage under Islamic law, citing her husband’s failure to pray, neglect to provide for her, and false accusations of adultery that led to her arrest and detention. The respondent denied the allegations but admitted to reporting the supposed adultery to the police. During the trial, the respondent was unable to provide witnesses to substantiate his claims. The Sharia Court dissolved the marriage and reprimanded the respondent for his unfounded accusations. Dissatisfied, the respondent appealed, leading to a series of appeals that ultimately upheld the dissolution of the marriage.

On definition, adultery is a consensual sexual intercourse between two persons of opposite sexes, where at least one of the parties is married to someone else. The act must occur after the marriage has been celebrated. When proving adultery, the burden lies on the party making the allegation to establish it to the court’s reasonable satisfaction. The standard of proof in adultery cases is on the preponderance of evidence, usually a little bit higher than that of civil cases. This principle was upheld in cases such as Ikpi v. Ikpi (1957) WRNLR 59, where the court emphasised that the evidence must be compelling but not to the level required in criminal matters.

To establish adultery,  circumstantial evidence often plays a crucial role since direct evidence is rare. Circumstantial evidence can include situations where the parties were alone in compromising circumstances, the contraction of a venereal disease, visits to a brothel, or confessions and admissions, though the latter must be treated cautiously. In Alabi v. Alabi, the birth of two children by Aramide Babatunde, one conceived before and one after the marriage, was sufficient evidence of adultery.

When assessing damages for adultery, the court considers the harm done to the petitioner’s honor, family life, and emotional well-being, rather than merely compensating for the petitioner’s loss. In Alabi v. Alabi, the court highlighted the severe impact on the respondent’s honor and family life, noting that the damages awarded were conservative given the circumstances.

In contrast, under Islamic law, proving adultery (Zina) requires the testimonies of four unimpeachable male Muslim witnesses who have seen the act. Now it gets serious in the sense that if even one witness provides a different version, the accused will be acquitted, and the other witnesses will be punished severely for giving false testimony. This high standard of proof underscores the gravity of such accusations in Islamic law. Moreover, in cases of “Lia’n,” where a husband will swear that he saw his wife making love with another man directly,  the husband must take a special oath five times before the court or a large gathering. Had he declined to take that multiple oath the punishment of Qazf, defamation, must be meted out on him. That is eighty lashes of cain.

In Tukurwa v. Kwa-Kwa (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 224) 449, the court reiterated that while adultery or fornication requires the testimony of four male witnesses under Islamic law, other cases can be proven with the testimony of at least two credible witnesses.

In conclusion, proving adultery under the Marriage Act and Islamic Law highlights the different approaches each system takes. While the Marriage Act relies on a preponderance of evidence and often circumstantial evidence, Islamic Law imposes a much stricter burden of proof, requiring the testimony of four unimpeachable male witnesses or the invocation of Lian.

Thank you for reading. See you next week.

Good afternoon, Readers. Our discussion today is divided into two parts. First, we will explore whether NYSC service is compulsory for eligible graduates. Second, we will examine whether a serving corps member can participate in partisan politics. To better understand these issues, the case of Modibbo v. Usman (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1712) 470 is relied upon. This issue is particularly relevant to many young Nigerians who are navigating their obligations under the NYSC scheme while considering their political ambitions.

On the first issue, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme is compulsory for all eligible Nigerian graduates. According to Section 2(3) of the National Youth Service Act, any person called upon to serve in the NYSC must do so for a continuous period of one year from the date of their call-up. Failure to report for service or refusal to make oneself available for the entire service year is considered an offense under Section 13(1) of the Act. The penalties for such an offense include a fine of N2,000 or imprisonment for a term of twelve months, or both.

Furthermore, Section 13(3) of the Act makes it an offense for any person to cause, aid, or abet another to contravene the provisions of the Act. This section specifically targets employers or organizations that might attempt to lure individuals away from fulfilling their mandatory service. The penalty for such an offense is a fine of N5,000 or imprisonment for a term of three years, or both. The law is clear that disobedience to the NYSC Act is not merely a matter of indiscipline but constitutes a criminal act.

The case of Modibbo v Usman revolves around a political dispute in the lead-up to the 2019 general elections. Both the appellant, Modibbo, and the respondent, Usman, were aspirants seeking to be the All Progressives Congress (APC) candidate for the House of Representatives seat representing Yola North/Yola South/Girei Federal Constituency of Adamawa State. On October 7, 2018, the APC conducted its primary election, in which Modibbo emerged victorious with 293 votes, while Usman, the respondent, secured 124 votes. Despite acknowledging his loss, Usman initiated legal action on November 5, 2018, challenging Modibbo’s eligibility to contest the primary election.

Usman claimed that Modibbo, at the time of the primary election, was still a serving corps member under the NYSC scheme. He argued that Modibbo’s participation in the primary election violated the NYSC Act and its Bye-Laws, which prohibit corps members from engaging in partisan politics. Usman also alleged that Modibbo provided false information about his age and educational qualifications in the forms submitted to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).

The court considered the core issue: whether a serving corps member could lawfully engage in partisan politics. According to Section 4 of the NYSC Act Bye-Law (Revised 2011), every member of the NYSC is expressly prohibited from participating in partisan politics. The law defines partisanship as any action that favours one political group or party over another, which includes active involvement in political contests.

The court emphasized that the rationale behind this prohibition is to prevent corruption and political thuggery, particularly among young people serving the nation under the NYSC scheme. The court noted that being a member of the NYSC is a public office, and the responsibilities associated with it are incompatible with holding a political position. This is because public officers, including corps members, are expected to maintain political neutrality during their service.

In Modibbo’s case, the court found that his participation in the primary election while still a serving corps member was a clear violation of the NYSC Act and Bye-Laws. It further held that the essence of the law is not merely to impose penalties but to prevent corps members from engaging in partisan political activities altogether. The court highlighted that a lawbreaker, such as someone violating the NYSC regulations, should not be allowed to become a lawmaker.

The court also addressed whether a person could benefit from their own illegality. It was established that no one is permitted to benefit from their own wrongdoing. Modibbo had concealed material facts in his INEC Forms CF001 and CF002, fraudulently stating that his Senior Secondary Certificate was his highest qualification, despite being a graduate with a B.Sc. in Public Administration. This deliberate falsehood was intended to deceive both the APC and INEC. The court found that Modibbo’s actions constituted a serious breach of legal and ethical standards. As established in cases such as Brosette Manufacturing Nig. Ltd. v. Ola Ilemobola Ltd. (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 379) 1346 and B.Manfag (Nig.) Ltd. v. M/S. O.I. Ltd. (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) 109, such acts of deception invalidate any claims to benefit from the resultant positions or opportunities.

In conclusion, the principle of law is that NYSC service is compulsory for eligible graduates, and during this period, any engagement in partisan politics is strictly prohibited.

Thank you for reading❤️. See you next week🙏