Month: October 2024

Hi readers, welcome to the last article for October. How are you, and I hope you’re doing well?

Today, we’re exploring an interesting aspect of Nigerian constitutional law, illustrated by the recent Supreme Court decision in Ani v. State (2024) LPELR-62746(SC). This case sheds light on Section 294(1) of the Nigerian Constitution, which mandates that judgments must be delivered within ninety days of the conclusion of evidence and final addresses. At the heart of the appeal was whether a judgment delivered beyond this timeframe automatically becomes invalid or if certain circumstances allow for exceptions. Samuel Ani, convicted for the murder of his uncle, challenged the validity of his trial court’s delayed judgment, contending that it violated his rights and sought to overturn his conviction based on this delay.

The Appellant’s Counsel argued that Section 294(1) uses the term “shall,” which implies a mandatory duty for courts to comply strictly with the ninety-day deadline. According to the defense, compliance with this timeframe ensures a fair judicial process and prevents judgments from being tainted by fading memory or unfair bias due to time lapses. The trial proceedings had ended in November 2016, with final addresses submitted in September 2017, yet the court did not deliver its judgment until July 2018. The defense cited cases like Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 1 SCNLR 427, Amadi v. NNPC (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 76, and Agip v. Agip Petrol Int’l (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1187) 348 to support the argument that delayed judgments might lead to unconstitutional outcomes. While acknowledging that the judge had been involved in an election tribunal and had health issues, they contended that these reasons did not fully account for the delay and that the integrity of the trial process had been compromised.

The Supreme Court, however, adopted a more nuanced approach to interpreting Section 294(1). The Court clarified that although the word “shall” generally suggests a command, it can be understood as either mandatory or permissive depending on the specific context of the case.

Citing Abdullahi v. The Military Administrator (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1165) 417, Atungwu v. Ochekwu (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1375) 605, and Amokeodo v. IGP (1999) LPELR-468 (SC), the Supreme Court emphasized that non-compliance with the ninety-day deadline does not automatically invalidate a judgment. According to Section 294(5) of the Constitution, a judgment will only be set aside if the delay causes a real miscarriage of justice. This means that to invalidate a delayed judgment, the complaining party must show that the delay itself harmed their case. This interpretation aims to prevent parties from exploiting procedural issues to invalidate judgments purely on technical grounds. Cotecna International Ltd v. Churchgate Nig. Ltd (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 346; Savannah Bank of Nig. Ltd v. Starite Industries (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1144) 491.

In the case under review, while both parties acknowledged that the judgment was delivered outside the stipulated ninety days, the Supreme Court found no substantial injustice had occurred. The Court noted that the appellant failed to demonstrate how the delay specifically impaired the judge’s evaluation of evidence or fairness of the proceedings. They reiterated that it is not merely the length of delay that matters but the effect of that delay on the judge’s reasoning. Even though the trial court experienced a considerable delay, the judgment was ultimately well-reasoned and backed by evidence.

The Court thus concluded that the appellant had not sufficiently shown any miscarriage of justice due to the delay. In its view, although the delay in the trial judgment was regrettable, the judge’s reasoning and conclusions were unaffected by it. Hence, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, dismissing the appeal.

In conclusion,  the principle of law is that a judgement delivered after the 90 days window won’t be set aside unless the complaining party can show that he suffered a miscarriage of justice as a result.

Thank you for reading ❤️. See you in November❤️🙏

Good afternoon, LSP Readers. Today, we’re looking at an important issue of law: Does the death of a bank customer automatically end the relationship between the bank and that customer? To understand this, we’ll rely on the case of Daura v. U.B.N. Plc (2024) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1957) 41, where this issue was examined in detail


The facts of this case was that the appellants’ mother, a customer of U.B.N., took out a loan of six million naira. Sadly, she passed away just a few days after. Her children, the appellants, became the administrators of her estate. They inherited over 15 million naira from her account in First Bank. Instead of using part of that money to settle her debt with U.B.N., they spent some on her funeral and shared the rest among themselves and other beneficiaries.

To take control of their mother’s assets, the children had to apply for letters of administration. A letter of administration is a legal document issued by a court that grants a person the authority to manage and distribute the estate of someone who has died without leaving a valid will. This allows the administrator to collect the deceased’s assets, settle any debts, and distribute what remains to the rightful beneficiaries. It’s essential in situations where there is no Will, as it gives legal power to the appointed individual to handle the estate responsibly. In this case, the children used their authority as administrators to access and distribute their mother’s funds, but they failed to pay off her debt to U.B.N. first.

Naturally, the bank wanted its money back, so it took the matter to court. However, the court dismissed the bank’s case, saying the bank did not prove its claim well enough. Dissatisfied, the bank appealed, and the Court of Appeal ruled in the bank’s favor. The children then took the case to the Supreme Court, hoping to overturn the decision

At the heart of the matter was the duty of the administrators of an estate. When a person dies, the administrators must first identify any debts the deceased left behind and settle those debts before distributing the estate’s assets. It’s not enough to claim ignorance of a debt; the law expects the administrators to make reasonable efforts to uncover all liabilities. In this case, the children failed to settle their mother’s debt to U.B.N. before distributing her estate, a mistake that led to the legal dispute

Another important point is about the responsibility of beneficiaries – people who inherit money or property from the deceased. If you receive money from an estate that still owes debts, you may be required to pay back part of what you received to settle those debts. In this case, the mother had other properties and shares that could have been used to pay off the loan. But even if those assets weren’t enough, the children, as beneficiaries, could still be asked to repay the debt from the money they inherited.

Now, to the core issue of determination – does a bank-customer relationship end with the customer’s death? Generally, yes, but with certain exceptions. The death of a customer terminates the everyday operations of a bank account, but it does not erase existing obligations, such as loans. The Supreme Court in this case made it clear that the obligation to repay a loan and any accrued interest survives the death of the borrower. The loan becomes a debt that must be paid from the deceased’s estate.

Interestingly, the Court of Appeal had previously ruled that the bank should have stopped charging interest once it became aware of the customer’s death. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that as long as the loan remains unpaid, the agreed-upon interest continues to accumulate. This means that the death of a debtor does not freeze interest on outstanding loans—the bank is still entitled to charge interest until the debt is fully repaid.

In conclusion, this case shows that death doesn’t wipe away financial obligations. If someone owes money, their estate is still responsible for settling those debts. Administrators need to be careful to pay off any debts before distributing money to the beneficiaries. It’s a good reminder to handle estate matters properly to avoid unnecessary legal troubles later on

Thank you for reading🤍. See you next week🙏

People often consider their names important to them and many may wish for exclusivity, believing their name should be uniquely theirs. However, in Nigeria, the law does not grant anyone the sole right to a personal name. No matter how significant a name may be to an individual, the principle of law is that it cannot be owned or restricted to one person.

In the case of Offoboche v. Offoboche (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt. 997) 298, the issue of monopoly of names came up for determination. In that case, the appellant claimed that the respondent was falsely presenting himself as his son and using his name. The appellant insisted that there was no biological, foster, or adopted relationship between them. In 1992, he asked his lawyers to send a letter to the respondent, urging him to stop this behaviour. When the respondent ignored the letter, the appellant published a disclaimer in a newspaper in 1998, but the respondent continued to use the appellant’s name.

As a result, the appellant filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that the respondent was not his son and requested an order for him to stop using his name. The respondent responded by asking the court to dismiss the case, arguing that it was unjustifiable and an abuse of process. The trial court ruled that the respondent was not related to the appellant but denied the request to prevent him from using the name, stating that he had the right to choose any name he wanted.

Dissatisfied with this decision, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the trial court’s conclusion about the respondent’s right to bear his name was unjustified. At the Court of Appeal, the main issue for determination was whether there is right to monopoly of names. Resolving this issue against the appellant, the court per Ibiyeye JCA opined that: ‘No legislation in Nigeria restricts a person to a fixed number of names or enjoys a monopoly of names. In effect, even if names are identical or the same, no person in Nigeria has a legal right to restrain another person from answering or bearing those names. In the instant case, the appellant was only creating a dispute where there was none. This was so because the respondent had cautiously decided not to contest the use of the names that appeared very dear to the appellant with him.’

In addition, the Court also held that ‘no person, group of persons or family has a monopoly of names. Persons have unrestrained liberty to pick and choose names that please them’. Similarly in Alliance for Democracy v. Fayose and Ors (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt. 932) 151, Nsofor JCA stated that ‘Of what concern or to whom does it matter if “A” chooses to be called or known by many, or very many names’ I confess that I know of no legislation or a Decree in Nigeria restricting any person(s) to a number of names he may be called or known by. No such law!’

Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that in law, persons are generally subdivided into two: juristic entities and natural persons. While the principle in Offoboche’s case resonates with the former, it doesn’t apply to the latter. This is because the law ensures that corporate names are distinct from one another to avoid deception. Specifically, Section 852(1)(a) of the Company and Allied Matters Act 2020 forbids identical names. Similarly, this principle of law has also received judicial approval in the popular case of Niger Chemists Limited v. Nigeria Chemists 7 (1961) ANLR 180 which is reiterated in the 2024 recent case of A. Dikko & Sons Ltd. v. C.A.C. (2024) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1939) 75.

In conclusion, everybody gather dey, lol.  you no fit say person you dey bear Jumoke make others no bear ham. Thank you for reading.❤️ See you next week🙏