Author: Kiki

Until now, there has been a foggy of uncertainty about the calculation of post-call years for legal practitioners in Nigeria. For instance, if an individual was called to the Nigerian Bar in November 2019, how many years has such an individual spent at the Bar till now?

This uncertainty has been demystified by the Federal High Court Abuja in the case under review. The Court stated ‘…. that the moment a person is called to bar, his Post Call year begins to count from that year he was called and the person must pay practicing fee for that year he was called to bar’.

Back to our example, an individual who was called to the Bar in November 2019 and paid his practicing fee in that year is deemed to have used one year at the Bar. If he pays in 2020, that makes it two years, and payment in 2021 makes it 3 years.

At this juncture, it is pertinent to state that the payment of the practicing fee is between January 1 of every year and March 31st of that year. The exception is for the new wigs who are usually not called to the Bar within that time frame. Nevertheless, they are required to pay their practicing fee within one month of enrollment. See Rule 9 (1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Furthermore, the consequence for nonpayment of practicing fee means that such a legal practitioner will not practice for that defaulting year. In addition, the fee varies and it is determined on how many years a lawyer has spent at the Bar.

The payment schedule is:

•Senior Advocates & Honourable Benchers – N50,000
•Legal Practitioners of 15 Years & above post call – N25,000
•Legal Practitioners of 10-14 Years post call – N17,500
•Legal Practitioners 5-9 Years post call – N10,000
•Legal Practitioners of 1-4 Years post call – N5,000

Thank you for reading. See you next week.

One of the irrefutable laws in life is that humans have origins. No matter how distant and clumsy the trace may be, we are all citizens of at least one country.

Citizenship can be defined as the status of being a citizen in a sovereign state. In Nigeria, Section 25-28 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended (hereinafter referred as CRFN 1999) extensively provides for three classes of citizenship. These are: citizenship by Birth, Registration, and by Naturalization.

On the issue of dual citizenship, S.28(1) CFRN 1999 provides that: Subject to the other provisions of this section, a person shall forfeit forthwith his Nigerian citizenship if, not being a citizen of Nigeria by birth, he acquires or retains the citizenship or nationality of a country, other than Nigeria, of which he is not a citizen by birth.

Furthermore, S.66 subsection(1)(a)CFRN 1999 states that: No person shall be qualified for election to the Senate or the House of Representatives if: (a) subject to the provisions of section 28 of this Constitution, he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a country other than Nigeria or, except in such cases as may be prescribed by the National Assembly, has made a declaration of allegiance to such a country.

Speaking in the same vein, this provision also echoes the similar position for prospective candidates into the position of a President, Governor, and the House of Assembly as seen in S.137, S.182 and S.107 of the CFRN 1999.

Now, the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution raise questions such as: is S.28 contrary to the provision of S.66(1)(a), does that mean an individual that possesses dual citizenship cannot seek an elective post in Nigeria?

These questions were judiciously proffered answers to in the Court of Appeal case of Dr Willie Ogebide v. Mr. Arigbe Osula.

Before giving the ratio decidendi (reason for judgment) of the Court, there is a need to comment on the phrase subject to as used in that provision of the Constitution. It’s a trite and well-settled principle of judicial interpretation that whenever the phrase “subject to” is used in a statute, the intention and legal effect is to make the provisions of the section inferior, or limited and restricted in application to the section to which they are made subject to. In other words, the provision of the latter section shall govern, control, and prevail over the provision of the section made subject to it. It renders the provision of the subject section subservient liable subordinate and inferior to the provisions of the other enactment. See the case of Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 592.

In this present case, it means S.66(1)(a) S.137(1); S.182(1), and S.107(1) are subjected to S.28. It’s not really about the numbers durgggg😀.

Based on this background, the Court of Appeal per Onnoghen JCA (as he then was) stated unequivocally that: ‘it is clear and I hereby hold that the acquisition of dual citizenship by a Nigerian per se is not a ground for disqualification for election to the National Assembly particularly where the Nigerian citizen is a citizen by birth. That is the clear meaning of the provisions in sections 66(1) and 28 of the 1999 constitution when taken together. The only Nigerian citizen disqualified by the said sections is one who is a citizen of Nigeria by either registration or naturalization who subsequently acquires the citizenship of another country in addition to his Nigerian citizenship…’

Putting it in a prospective, if Charlie is a Nigerian by birth and goes ahead to acquire the citizenship of another country, making it a dual citizenship, he cannot be barred from contesting in an elective office. However, if a Ghanian man comes to Nigeria and becomes a Nigerian through Naturalization after fulfilling the requirements, then proceeded to acquire the citizenship of another country, such a person will not be allowed to contest.

From a keen observation, we could see that the court that gave this erudite pronouncement was the Court of Appeal. Could such a decision be changed by the Supreme Court? After all, the Supreme Court is the highest court in the land and has the power to set aside any other courts’ decision. The answer is no. The reason being that by virtue of S.246(3) CFRN 1999, the decisions of the Court of Appeal in respect to appeals arising from the National and State Houses of Assembly election petitions are final. See the cases of: Onuaguluchi v Ndu [2001] 7 NWLR (pt.712) 309; Awuse v Odilli [2013] 18 NWLR (pt.851) 116, Abubakar & Anon v Usman v Ors [2017] LPELR-SC. 167/2016

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It is the first article for 2021 and we are officially wishing our esteemed readers a prosperous new year.

Today’s analysis centers on whether or not the beneficiaries covered by the Immunity Clause under the Constitution can sue someone else.

Immunity can be defined as the exemption from a prosecution granted by statute or government authority. The rationale behind this protection is that if the beneficiaries are not distracted and pressurized as a result of litigation, they will have ample time to discharge their functions without encumbrance.

The Immunity Clause is entrenched in S.308 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and it protects the President, Vice President, Governor, and Deputy Governor.

The section of the Constitution that pertains to this analysis provides that: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, but subject to subsection(2) of this section: (a) No civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person to whom this section applies during his period of office….

In this case under study, the respondent brought an action of alleged libel against the appellants and claimed for the sum of N5 million (Five million naira) damages for libel and exemplary or punitive damages of N10 billion (Ten billion naira).

Conversely, the appellants argued, that by virtue of S.308 of the Constitution, a Governor cannot be sued neither can he sue. The rationale behind their submission was that it will amount to absurdity and lead to injustice to hold that the respondent who is immune from legal proceedings by any person is the very person who is also free to institute actions against any person in his personal capacity for any wrong during the period of immunity.

However, the court jettisoned this argument. The court in this present case was aided by the principles guiding the court in interpreting or constructing the provisions of the constitution as enunciated in the case of AG Bendel State v. AG Federation & Ors (1982) 3 NCLR 1, (1981) 9 S.C. (Reprint) 1 at 78-79 one of which is that, the language of the Constitution, where clear and unambiguous, must be given its plain evident meaning.

While giving the lead judgment, Onnoghen JSC (as he then was) held that: ‘from the words used by the framers of section 308 of the 1999 Constitution, it is clear that their intention is explicitly to confer absolute immunity on the respondent and the others therein mentioned without a corresponding disability on them to the exercise of their rights to institute actions in their personal capacities in any relevant court of law for redress during their tenure of office, as in the instant case.

Furthermore, Aderemi J.S.C (as he then was) took the court on a longevity pilgrimage to emphasize that the court will interpret the law according to the ordinary meaning by opining that: ‘it must always be remembered that judges have no business expanding the law or even making same: that is the exclusive function of the lawmakers. It is often said that a Judge, in interpreting the provisions of any law, must get at the intention of the legislators. Yes, that is a true statement; but in demonstrating his judicial interpretative skill, a judge can get to know the intention of the legislators only through the wordings of the provisions of the statute or section of the Constitution being interpreted. Let it be remembered that when in the words used in couching the provision, there is no ambiguity, then no exposition contrary to the expressed words used, is to be made. There is NOTHING and I repeat NOTHING PREVENTING a Governor or Deputy Governor from taking out a writ of summons or originating summons or better put, suing anybody whilst still in office. The above is the clear and, in my humble view, a true interpretation of that section; that is a true declaration of the law. To do otherwise is to declare what the law ought to be which is not the function of the judex. If it is thought that the law ought to be amended, let that be the exclusive function of the legislators-members of our National Assembly. Section 308 of the aforesaid does no more than to confer absolute immunity on the holder of the position of the Governor or Deputy Governor in the state without drawing away from them their rights to seek a redress for any wrong done to them by instituting actions in their personal capacities against anybody they may think has transgressed their rights even while they are still in office’.

The ratio decidendi (rationale for the decision) also followed the cases of Tinubu v IMB Securities (SC 32/2001) [2001] 10, Chief Onabanjo v Concord Press of Nigeria Ltd. (1981) 2 NCLR 398, etc.

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