Category: Law

Personally, I love public holidays. They offer me the best opportunity to catch up with school activities. As I have always written to you readers, law permeates the entirety of human endeavours. In Nigeria, the law governing public holidays is the Public Holidays Act. 

Today’s analysis centers on whether or not Saturdays and Sundays are holidays within the Act and the effect of legal actions carried out on those days. As held in Etsako West L.G.C. v. Christopher(2014)14 NWLR (Pt. 1426) 73, by virtue of section 15(5) of the Interpretation Act, “holiday” as used in Section 15 of the Act, means a day which is a Sunday or a public holiday. As contained in the schedule, Public holidays in Nigeria are New Year’s Day; Good Friday; Easter Monday; Workers’ Day (1st May); National  Day (1st October); Christmas Day; Such day as the Minister may declare to be a public holiday in celebration of the Muslim festival of Id el Fitr, Id el Kabir and celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammed (Id el Maulud).

In addition to days mentioned in the Schedule of this Act, the President may by public notice appoint a special day to be kept as a public holiday either throughout Nigeria or in any part thereof, and any day so appointed shall be kept as a public holiday. Section 2 of the Act. Based on this, Saturday is not a public holiday within the act. In addition, while a public holiday necessarily includes a work-free day, a work-free day like a Saturday is not synonymous with a public holiday unless expressly so declared. Anie v. Uzorka (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 309) 1.

While this appears simple, it usually becomes complicated in election tribunals. One of the traits of all laws affecting election petition tribunals is the essentiality of time. The spirit of the laws is that petitions should be given expeditious adjudication to enable the parties to know the status. Abdullahi v. Elayo (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 268) 171.

In filling election petitions or appeals, the date of the event is excluded from the computation of time, and the last day being a dias non-juridicus cannot also be taken into reckoning in the computation of time. The principle of the exclusion of the day of the happening of an event has become a principle of general acceptance. Where a statutory period runs from a named date to another, or the statute prescribes some period of days or weeks or months or years within which some act has to be done, although the computation of the period must in every case depend on the intention of parliament as gathered from the statute, generally, the first day of the period will be excluded from the reckoning, and consequently the last day will be included. 

However, where the last day within which to do the act is a Sunday which is statutorily declared to be a public holiday by virtue of section 15(5) of the Interpretation Act, the period for the doing of the act shall extend till the next day in view of the provision of section 15(2)(b) and of the Interpretation Act. 

In Yakubu v. F.R.N. (2023) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1864) 9,  judgment was delivered by the trial court on the 28th January 2013, time for filing a notice of appeal began to run from the 29th January 2013 up until the prescribed 90th day, which was the 28th April 2013. However, since the 28th of April, 2013 was a Sunday, a statutory public holiday, the notice of appeal filed by the respondent to challenge the decision of the trial court, on the 29th of April 2013, being the 91st day after the judgment was delivered, was valid. In Shugaba v. U.B.N. Plc (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 500) 481, the Court of appeal held that the ruling of the court below was not invalidated by reason of the fact that it was delivered on a Saturday.

Furthermore, it is pertinent to state that High Court Civil Procedure rules can depart from this general rule and make Saturday a public holiday. This is because the computation of time in election petitions is a matter of court practice and each court has its way of doing things. Hence, in Ikpala Est. Hotels Ltd. v. N.E.P.A. (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 884) 249, the Court held that since the statute that regulates the practice and procedure of the High Court of Cross River State, that is, the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules contemplates Saturday as a public holiday or a work-free day, Section 15(5) of the Interpretation Act and Section 1 of the Public Holidays Act would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.

On the propriety of hearing a case on a public holiday, the court in Okubre v. Ibanga (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 154) 1 held that “a public holiday in this country is like a Sunday, dies non jurisdicus, and no legal proceedings can be held on such a day. Dies non juridicum is the full Latin phrase literally meaning “Day without judiciary.” The expression dies non (juridicus) was used for defining a day which is not a (court) day or a day on which no legal business is carried on.”

In conclusion, unless expressly forbidden by Rules of Courts, the general principle of law is that Saturday as a day of the week does not qualify as a public holiday. Therefore, in computing the time within which to file an election petition, Saturday will not be reckoned as a public holiday. Kaugama v. N.E.C. (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 284) 681; Balogun v. Odumosu (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt. 592) 590; A.-G., Ondo State v. A.-G., Ekiti State(2001) 17 NWLR (Pt. 732) 706.

Thank you for reading. See you next week.

The Supreme Court of Nigeria is the apex court of the land. The Court, just as every other court in this country, is a creation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and its jurisdiction is donated and circumscribed by the 1999 Constitution, and the Supreme Court Act. Obiuweubi v. Central Bank of Nigeria (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465.

Apart from the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court contained in section 232 of the Constitution, the National Assembly also has the power to confer additional original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court on any issue excluding Criminal matters. In the exercise of this power, the National Assembly enacted the Supreme Court (Additional Original Jurisdiction) Act CAP S16 LFN 2004. 

Section 1(1) of the Supreme Court (Additional Original Jurisdiction) Act states the Supreme Court shall to the exclusion of any other court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute between –

(a)the National Assembly and the President;

(b)the National Assembly and any State House of Assembly; and

(c)the National Assembly and the State of the Federation. In so far as that dispute involves any question, whether of law or fact, on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. 

As held in Oko v. A.G. Ebonyi State (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1795) 63, a legal right is a right recognisable in law. It means a right recognised by law and capable of being enforced by the plaintiff. It is a right of a party recognised and protected by a rule of law, the violation of which would be a legal wrong done to the interest of the plaintiff, even though no action is taken. The determination of the existence of a legal right is not whether the action will succeed at the trial but whether the action denotes such a right by reference to the enabling law in respect of the commencement of the action. See also A.G Lagos State v. AG Federation (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 833) 1

So in the case of President, F.R.N. v. National Assembly (2023) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1870) 1, upon the presentation of the Electoral Bill 2022 to the plaintiff, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, he assented to it and it became law, to wit, the Electoral Act, 2022. Thereafter, the case of the plaintiff was that section 84(12)of the Electoral Act, 2022 was unconstitutional, null, and void, being discriminatory against political appointees and therefore violated the provisions of section 42(1) of the Constitution, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the United Nations Declarations on Human Rights.

Upon careful examination, the Supreme Court held that the case did not involve any question on which the existence or extent of any legal right depended, nor involved the civil rights and obligations of the plaintiff. The action, therefore did not fall within the ambit of section 232 of the the1999 Constitution (as amended) and Section 1(1)of the Supreme Court (Additional Jurisdiction)Act 2002.

Thank you for reading. See you next week.

Defilement is one of the sexual offences under Nigerian Criminal Law. As a general rule, the offence of defilement is statutorily provided for under Section 218 of the Criminal Code Act. The section states that Any person who has unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of 13 years is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life.

The Criminal Code Act is a federal statute applicable in Abuja. The act doesn’t have nationwide coverage as each state in the federation has the right to make its own criminal law. That explains why we have, for instance, the Criminal code law of Ekiti State, and the Criminal Code law of Delta state among others. The rationale is that crimes in Nigeria are generally territorial. 

This distinction is important because the victim’s age for the offence of defilement varies according to each code. For example, in Delta state, defilement is a crime committed against a girl under the age of 11 years while in Lagos State, it is under the age of 18 years. 

To succeed in a case of defilement, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following ingredients: 

1. that the accused had sex with the child who was under the age of 11 years;

2. that there was penetration into the vault of the vagina; and

3. that the evidence of the child must be corroborated.

The evidence for defilement is the same as in rape except that for defilement, it is immaterial whether the act was done with or without the consent of the child. A girl under the age of eleven is a child and so is not capable of consenting to sex. The court would hold that she did not consent even if she did consent. A child cannot consent to sex as held in Onwuta v. State of Lagos (2022) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1863) 701. Similarly, in Ahmed v. Nigerian Army (2016) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1540, the court held that in the offence of rape, lack of consent is material, in a case of defilement, the consent of the prosecutrix is immaterial.

In Adonike v. State (2015) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1458) 237, on or about the 16th day of June 2010, the appellant invited and requested a child of 5 years of age to buy a sachet of water for him. On her return, the appellant lured her into his room, pulled her pant, and had carnal knowledge of her. The appellant was arrested and charged to court for defilement punishable under section 218 of the Criminal Code Cap. 48 Volume 11, Laws of the defunct Bendel State 1976 as applicable in Delta State. The trial court sentenced him to six years imprisonment. The conviction was also affirmed by both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

Furthermore, when a child gives evidence and says that the accused had sex with her, the court cannot convict the accused on the uncorroborated testimony of the child alone. The evidence given by the child must be corroborated. Corroboration is independent evidence that confirms or makes more certain the testimony of the child and may be:-

(a)admission by the accused person that he committed the offence; or

(b)circumstantial evidence; and

(c)medical evidence.

In the instant case, the evidence given by the child(PW1) that the appellant forcibly had sex with her was corroborated by the evidence of PW3, the Medical Doctor, and exhibit A, the Medical Report which showed injury to the private part of the child. That, together with the positive identification of the appellant by the child (PW1) that it was he who lured her into his room and had sex with her, was conclusive that the evidence of the child was corroborated. 

However, there is a clog in the wheel of justice relating to the offence of defilement. Section 218 of the criminal code provides, among other things, that cases of defilement of a child must commence within two months from the time it was committed. As held in Gbadehan v. Kiladejo (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1326) 392, any provision in any law that imposes a limitation of time upon an existing right of action has the same effect as a statute of limitation. Where a statute of limitation provides a period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. An action instituted after the expiration of the period stipulated in the statute of limitation is not maintainable.

So in the case under review, the appellant was alleged to have had unlawful carnal knowledge a girl of five years on or about the 16th of June, 2010. The trial of the appellant did not commence until November, 2010, clearly above the two months prescribed by the law under which the appellant was charged. 

Ordinarily, the law would have been allowed to take its course. But that was not the case here. Under section 218 of the Delta State Criminal Code Law Cap. C.21, Laws of Delta State, 2008 (under which the appellant was convicted), there is no provision for time-limit within which prosecution must commence in an offence of defilement. This is a welcome development by the Delta state government. It is suggested by this writer that the two months limitation period in the Federal Act be removed so that a pedophile would not escape punishment on the ground of technicalities.  

Thank you for reading. See you next week.