LSP122: Fiat

A fiat is a Latin word which means ‘Let it be done’. Technically therefore, it denotes the grant or conferment of power on another by a person having complete authority on the issue upon which the fiat is given in matters of prosecution. The Attorney-General of a State or of the Federation can give such a fiat. A Commissioner of Police can delegate his officers or private legal practitioners to represent him in a case. ONWUAMADIKE v. STATE OF LAGOS & ORS (2019) LPELR-53005(CA).

Now what’s the duration of a fiat? The decisions of the Court of Appeal and of the Apex Court on this issue are replete.

The Supreme Court in NWAIGWE v THE STATE (2013) LPELR 20941 (SC) held thus: “… Once a fiat is granted to a Counsel to prosecute or defend a case, the validity of the fiat would continue throughout the duration of the case for which the fiat was granted.” See also in Ebe v Commissioner of Police (2008) All FWLR (Pt.406).

In that case, the Appellant’s Counsel argued that the prosecuting Counsel had a fiat to prosecute Charge No MID/136C/2014 but was not authorized to file a fresh case at the High Court under Charge No HID/19C/2014. They claimed it was an entirely new charge. However, records indicate that it’s the same case that started at the Chief Magistrate Court, and a fiat was issued by the Attorney General to the Prosecuting Counsel to continue it in the High Court. The change in the charge number from MID/136C/2014 to HID/19C/2014 was criticized by the Appellant’s Counsel, but the court considered this argument as insignificant since charge numbers change based on the hierarchy of courts, even for the same case.

In the case of C.O.P v. ONUORAH (2020) LPELR-50797(CA), a key question was whether a fiat issued by the Attorney-General needed to have the NBA stamp and seal. The court’s ruling established that the fiat provided to J.O. Onyejekwe, Esq., by the Attorney General did not necessitate the inclusion of an NBA stamp and seal.

Though, “fiat” is commonly employed in legal circles, including lawyers, attorney generals, and other legal professionals. However, it can also be utilized by judges as it serves as an administrative tool designed to facilitate convenience and expedite the process of delivering justice.

As such, a fiat can be issued by a chief judge of a state to another judge in that jurisdiction to either take up a case or finish a case he started before completion. While this seems easy, the legal question is where does time start to count in the instance of a transferred judge and an existing case? This matter came up for consideration in ABUGA & ANOR v. AJAGABO (2020) LPELR-52281(CA).

In that case, the appeal stems from a case in the High Court of Justice, Nasarawa State, with a judgment date of October 16, 2014. The Respondent, the plaintiff at the court of first instance (trial court) sought certain declarations and an order regarding a farmland dispute in the Upper Area Court, Nasarawa Eggon. The trial was presided over by Judge V.V. Manga until he was transferred to the Chief Magistrate Court Wamba on October 25, 2012.

To allow Judge V.V. Manga concluded the case, the Respondent applied for a fiat from the Chief Judge of Nasarawa State. This fiat was approved on January 15, 2013, with a 40 working day limit to complete the proceedings. Judge V.V. Manga resumed proceedings on June 14, 2013, but the 40 working days expired on August 6, 2013, before the case concluded. The Respondent applied for another fiat, which was granted on September 4, 2013, allowing for an additional 22 working days to finish the case.

Judge V.V. Manga completed the proceedings and delivered a judgment, dismissing the Respondent’s case. The Respondent appealed to the High Court of Nasarawa State, arguing that the trial court exceeded the fiat’s allowed timeframe. The High Court accepted this argument and set aside the trial court’s decision, leading the Appellants to appeal to the Court of Appeal. One of the issues in question is whether the lower court correctly interpreted the start date of the fiat as the date it was issued.

The court of appeal held that the proper and purposive construction is that the period granted in the fiat would run from the date that the sole Judge commenced sitting and hearing of the part heard matter and not the day it was granted.

In conclusion, a fiat is a legal instrument issued by an authorized individual, such as the Attorney General or Chief Justices, to empower another person to handle a specific matter. When granted by the Attorney General, it remains in effect until the matter is concluded. In the case of justices, it begins from the date when the partially heard matter begins.

Thank you for reading. See you next week.