THE LEGAL STANDPOINT WRAP Hello LSP Tribe!. It’s your lead content creator, Kiki, here with the 2024 wrap-up for The Legal Standpoint!
This year, we recorded an incredible 62,004 views – an increase of 17,000 from last year. Out of the 52 weeks in 2024, we published in 36 weeks. The remaining 16 weeks were the breaks dedicated to my first and second semester exams preparation, as well as 2 weeks of well-needed breaks to recharge.
I’m truly grateful to each of you for reading, sharing, and supporting The Legal Standpoint. Together, we’ve made a meaningful impact on legal education in Nigeria.
Thank you for being a part of this journey in 2024. Here’s to an even better 2025!
It’s another Thursday, and today we’ll discuss what the law says about excessive speeding. To do this, we’ll look at the case of Fan Milk Ltd. v. Edemeroh (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 402, which highlights key legal principles on the issue.
In this case, the respondent, on behalf of his family, sued Fan Milk Ltd., the company that owned the vehicle involved in the fatal accident. On September 30, 1988, the appellant’s vehicle, a Fiat lorry driven by Alfred Edekhionta, collided with a bus carrying the respondent’s two sons, Festus and Edward Edemeroh, who tragically died in the accident.
The respondent claimed that the driver, an agent of Fan Milk Ltd., acted negligently and recklessly by driving on the wrong side of the road and at excessive speed. He relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, arguing that the circumstances of the accident spoke for themselves, showing negligence. The respondent sought compensation for various losses, including his sons’ educational expenses, medical costs, funeral expenses, and the loss of their future life and potential.
In defense, Fan Milk Ltd. denied negligence and pointed to the driver of the bus, Urban Bus No. LA 3519 AJ, as the one responsible for the accident. The appellant further argued that if the bus driver had been more cautious, the collision could have been avoided. After reviewing the evidence and arguments, the trial court ruled in favour of the respondent. Dissatisfied with the decision, Fan Milk Ltd. appealed to the Court of Appeal, questioning whether the respondent had proven the negligence of their driver, particularly since no witness testified to the specific manner in which the driver was driving at the time of the accident.
In this case, the issue of excessive speed was central to the respondent’s claim. However, by virtue of Section 179(4) of the Evidence Act, the evidence of a single witness alone is insufficient to prove allegations of excessive speed. Such evidence must be corroborated. The rationale behind this is that serious allegations like excessive speeding should be backed by reliable and sufficient evidence to prove their veracity. A similar principle was also held in Agbonavbare v. Ogbebor (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1037) 605.
The evidence of P.W.6, Sergeant Effiong Emmanuel, the police officer who investigated the accident, was crucial. Sergeant Emmanuel testified that, had the driver of the appellant’s vehicle not died, he would have been charged with manslaughter and dangerous driving. He also introduced Exhibit “G”, a sketch he drew based on the scene of the accident.
Exhibit “G” played a pivotal role in corroborating the allegations of negligence. The sketch clearly showed that the two vehicles involved in the collision were positioned on the same side of the road, indicating a head-on crash on a section of the Ibadan/Lagos expressway, which was meant to be a single-lane road at that point. The absence of representatives from either party when the sketch was drawn did not undermine its credibility, as it was based on the physical positions of the vehicles at the scene. Thus, Exhibit “G,” along with the testimony of P.W.6, provided the necessary corroboration to substantiate the allegation of excessive speed and the negligent driving of the appellant’s vehicle.
Another key principle concerns the presumption of negligence when a driver is found on the wrong side of a dual carriageway. In general, a driver who operates a vehicle on the wrong side of the road and causes an accident is presumed negligent. The exception to this presumption arises only when there is a road diversion, forcing vehicles from the opposite direction to share one side of the road. In this case, the impact occurred on the side of the road where the respondent’s children had the right of way. Since the appellant’s driver was on the wrong side of the dual carriageway, the court held that the driver was primarily negligent.
Finally, there is the principle that places the burden of proof on the party alleging a road diversion in cases of accidents on dual carriageways. If a defendant claims that a road diversion was the cause of an accident, it is their responsibility to provide evidence of this diversion. As such, the appellant failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that a road diversion had occurred, and this further weakened their defense.
Moving on, a significant distinction in this case is that the accused driver had died. Had he been alive, he would have been charged under criminal law for causing death by dangerous driving. As held in Adeyemo v. State (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1485) 311, the elements of the offense of causing death by dangerous driving include the recklessness or dangerousness of the driving, the causal link to the death, and the accident occurring on a Federal Highway. This principle was also discussed in Amusa v. State (2003) 4 NWLR (Pt. 811) 595 and Aruna v. State (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 155) 125.
Funnily enough, had the driver survived, he would have faced a criminal trial for manslaughter and dangerous driving. Nevertheless, nothing would have prevented the family of the deceased children from bringing a civil claim against Fan Milk Ltd. based on the doctrine of vicarious liability, holding the company responsible for the actions of its employee.
Omooo! What a year it has been. Thanks for staying with us all through. We go again next year.❤️
My people! Good Afternoon. How has your week been?
Today, we will be discussing an important issue in criminal law causation in murder and manslaughter cases. Specifically, we will examine the case of Aiguoreghian v. State (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 860) 367 which raises important questions about the relationship between an accused person’s actions and the eventual death of a victim, particularly within the a year and a day rule stated in the Section 314 of the Criminal Code Act
The Facts of the Case
On March 7, 1989, Chief Alfred Amu instructed Mr. Doherty Sunny Osifo (PW2), an agricultural expert, to visit a family farm and assess its condition. The deceased, Nathaniel Amu, accompanied PW2 to the farm where the appellants worked as security guards. Upon arrival, a dispute occurred because the appellants, following the farm manager’s instructions, refused to open the gate. The situation escalated when the deceased attempted to force open the gate, leading to an alleged assault by the appellants. In the chaos, a mob mistook PW2 for a thief and attacked him as well.
The deceased sustained serious injuries and was taken to the police station, then to the hospital. He was treated and discharged on March 20, 1989, appearing to recover. However, several months later, he developed symptoms such as a swollen stomach and legs. Despite treatment at the University of Benin Teaching Hospital (UBTH), he passed away on June 29, 1989. The cause of death was subject to conflicting medical opinions. A provisional diagnosis suggested liver cirrhosis, but an autopsy revealed liver abscesses and cysts, unrelated to the earlier injuries. The appellants were charged with murder but were convicted of manslaughter, receiving a seven-year sentence. Their appeals were dismissed.
Legal Principles and Decision
(A) Proof of Murder: In criminal law, to prove murder, the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s actions directly caused the victim’s death. It is not sufficient for the prosecution to show that the accused’s actions “could have” caused the death; the prosecution must demonstrate that the actions were the direct cause of death. P. v. Oledinma (1940) 6 WACA 202, Omogodo v. State (1981) 5 SC 5. In this case, the evidence was insufficient to link the appellants’ actions to the victim’s death, leading to a conviction of manslaughter instead of murder.
(B) The Duration Between the Act and the Death: The time between the act and the death does not always affect the determination of causation in murder cases. The key issue is whether the accused’s actions directly led to the death. Even if there is a considerable delay between the act and the death, a conviction for murder or manslaughter may still be valid if it is proven that the accused’s actions were the direct cause of the death. This principle was established in Uyo v. A.-G Bendel State (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 17) 418. However, if multiple potential causes of death exist and none can be definitively proven to be the direct cause, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the accused.
3. Chain of Causation: The chain of causation principle holds that the accused can only be held responsible for the death if their actions were the proximate cause of it. If there is an intervening cause that breaks the chain (known as novus actus interveniens), the accused may not be held liable. In this case, medical evidence suggested multiple possible causes for the deceased’s death, which weakened the argument that the appellants’ actions directly caused the death. R. v. Effanga (1996) 1 All NLR 339, Oguntolu v. State (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt. 432) 503.
4. A Year and a Day Rule: The rule in question says that someone is not criminally responsible for another person’s death if the death does not happen within one year and one day from the act that caused it. For example, if someone is injured in an incident but does not die until more than a year later, the person who caused the injury might not be held criminally responsible for the death.
The Supreme Court clarified that this rule only applies when the person accused of causing the death is found guilty. If the court decides the accused person is not guilty, then the rule doesn’t matter because there’s no crime to be responsible for. In the case being discussed, even though the deceased died within the year and a day from the incident, the accused were not found guilty of murder or manslaughter. Therefore, the rule didn’t apply in this case because the accused weren’t found guilty.
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